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Disclaimers of Contractual Liability and 
Voluntary Obligations
MICHAEL G PRATT*
*  I am grateful to participants in the 2014 International Conference on Contracts in Miami 
for comments on an earlier draft, to Jamie Cameron for pressing me to clarify certain points 
in the paper, and to Warren Whiteknight for his research assistance. An earlier version 
of this article was originally presented at the Symposium in Honour of John McCamus: 
Scholarship, Teaching and Leadership (7 February 2013), hosted at Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Toronto.
Contractual obligations are traditionally regarded as voluntary. A voluntary obligation is 
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I WAS ONCE A FIRST-YEAR STUDENT AT OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL. That was 
a long time ago, but it often occurs to me that a significant part of my life now, 
all these years later, is a product of a single, arbitrary decision by an administrator 
at Osgoode to place me in the contract law course taught by Professor McCamus.
I could not have known it at the time, but having been in this business for 
a while now, it is all too clear to me just how rare is the quality of instruction 
Professor McCamus provided to his first-year charges in that course on contracts. 
Several aspects of the course remain prominent for me. Professor McCamus took 
us seriously as thoughtful future participants in the business of making the law. 
He engaged with us, pressing us to articulate principles from the cases and to say 
whether we thought the courts were getting things right or wrong. We knew we 
were part of something more than a merely academic pursuit—that our thoughts 
on the often arcane doctrines we were learning could come to really matter in the 
world. But I was most struck by what Professor McCamus revealed to us about 
the other side of this coin—about what it is to engage in a serious academic 
study of the law. I knew there were folks called “law professors” who apparently 
understood a lot about the law. But I did not imagine that the law could be 
subjected to the same sort of careful, exacting, and critical scrutiny that professors 
in disciplines like philosophy and the sciences bring to bear on their subjects. 
And yet that is exactly what Professor McCamus was doing, and encouraging us 
to do, in that first-year classroom.
Here was a brilliant teacher inviting us to see cases as arguments for 
propositions, to formulate the bases for those arguments, and to evaluate them. 
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He did not confine himself within the bounds of the subject that he was assigned 
to teach. He would routinely venture across the contract boundary into tort, 
restitution, property, equity, and everything in between (the remarkable depth 
and breadth of his knowledge were apparent even to a first-year student) to draw 
contrasts and trace principles to their roots. It was exhilarating. No single course 
I have ever taken inspired me towards a career thinking and writing about the 
law more than that one did. And it is no coincidence that contract law is the field 
in which I do most of my research and teaching. I came away from Professor 
McCamus’s course with a sense that the law of contract is venerable, fundamental, 
and challenging, and that it might even be beautiful if one could see the whole 
of it clearly enough. I left no other course in law school feeling even remotely 
the same way (as much as I enjoyed many of them). Perhaps no other law school 
subject could leave such an impression on a student. I will leave that idea alone. 
But even if contract law is a jewel in the common law, rare is the teacher who sees 
it for what it is, and rarer still is the teacher who inspires his or her students to 
see it that way. I am very grateful to have been taught by one of those teachers.
In this article, I pay tribute to the teacher who taught me the basic principles 
of contract law by drawing on those principles to establish certain fundamental 
features of contractual liability. Professor McCamus not only conveyed to his 
students his deep respect for the authority of case law and for legal history 
(drawing often on his rich understanding of the history of the common law), 
but he also taught us that part of what it is to respect the common law is to call 
on it to justify itself and to scrutinize without compromise the answers it gives. I 
hope that some of the same sense of respect through rigorous scrutiny is reflected 
in what follows.
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal orthodoxy has it that contractual obligations are voluntary. It is this that 
separates contract from tort on the map of civil obligations. Whereas tortious 
duties arise by operation of law, liability in contract is traditionally understood to 
be voluntarily created by the parties themselves.1
1. According to PS Atiyah: “Broadly speaking, the law of contract is that part of the law which 
deals with obligations which are self-imposed.” PS Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of 
Contract, 5th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 1 [Atiyah, Law of Contract]. 
According to Stephen A Smith: “The traditional and still orthodox view of the nature of 
contractual obligations is that they are self-imposed promissory obligations.” Stephen A 
Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 56 [Smith, Contract 
Theory] [emphasis omitted].
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What is it that distinguishes an obligation as voluntary? In an attenuated 
sense, every obligation that is knowingly acquired by an agent who could 
have avoided it is a “voluntary” obligation. But this conception of voluntary 
obligations does not capture the distinctive and robust sense in which the 
obligations of contracts are typically understood to be voluntary. After all, most 
legal obligations can be acquired knowingly or intentionally, including those of 
the tortious or criminal variety. The drifter who commits an offence on a bitter 
winter’s night with the aim of becoming bound to spend time detained in a warm 
cell has acquired that obligation voluntarily, but the obligation is not properly 
described as a “voluntary” one.2
The voluntariness of an obligation is a property not of the mental state 
of the agent who acquires it but of the conditions under which the obligation 
obtains (i.e., its triggering conditions).3 The reason the drifter’s duty to submit 
to incarceration is not voluntary is that his intention to acquire it played no role 
in his having acquired it. What distinguishes an obligation as voluntary is that it 
obtains only if the obligor intends to acquire it. A voluntary obligation is one that 
depends on the intention of the obligor to take it on. Contractual obligations 
are voluntary in this robust sense, then, if and only if the law requires that an 
agreement is enforceable as a contract only if the parties intended to create legal 
obligations when they made it.4
Is such a requirement part of Canadian law? One need not look far to find 
judicial assertions of such a requirement. Indeed, statements to the effect that a 
contract is formed only if the parties intend to create legal obligations (or “legal 
2. Neil MacCormick, “Voluntary Obligations” in Neil MacCormick, ed, Legal Right and Social 
Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
190 at 190.
3. Joseph Raz makes this point. See Joseph Raz, “Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers” 
(1972) 46:1 Proc Aristotelian Soc’y Supp 79; Joseph Raz, “Promises in Morality and Law”, 
Book Review of Promises, Morals, and Law by PS Atiyah, (1982) 95:4 Harv L Rev 916.
4. As I use the term in this article, “agreement” is to be construed liberally as embracing all 
arrangements that evince the kind of consensus necessary to attract the law of contract. 
In this article, I am concerned only with the extent to which an intention to create legal 
relations must be part of this consensus.
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relations”) are scattered throughout the law reports.5 Nevertheless, scholars often 
doubt that such a requirement is in fact part of the common law of contract, in 
Canada or elsewhere.6 These skeptics point out that the law is more about what 
judges do than about what they say, and in most contracts cases judges do not 
even address whether the parties intended their agreement to be legally binding. 
Genuine factual inquiries into the issue are quite unusual.7
Of course, courts occasionally do purport to refuse to enforce agreements on 
the basis that the parties did not intend to be legally bound. Balfour v Balfour,8 
5. For the classic statement of that, see Balfour v Balfour, [1919] 2 KB 571, [1918-19] All 
ER Rep 860 at 864 (Eng) [Balfour]. Atkin LJ wrote of most domestic agreements that “[t]
hey are not contracts … because the parties did not intend that they should be attended by 
legal consequences.” See also Carman Construction v CPR, [1982] 1 SCR 958 at para 19, 
136 DLR (3d) 193. The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statement made during a 
tendering process was not enforceable as a collateral contract because such contracts “must 
be established, as in the case of any other contract, by proof of an intention to contract.” 
In Matchim v BGI Atlantic Inc, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held 
that “intention to create legal relations. … [must] be present to constitute an enforceable 
contract.” Matchim v BGI Atlantic Inc, 2010 NLCA 9 at para 21, 294 Nfld & PEIR 46. In a 
case involving an agreement of purchase and sale made by an exchange of e-mails, the court 
approached the question of enforceability by asking a “fundamental question: Was there an 
intention to create legal relations?” See Girouard v Druet, 2012 NBCA 40 at para 3, 349 
DLR (4th) 116.
6. Numerous authors have doubted that there is a genuine requirement of an intention to 
create legal relations in contract law, independent of the doctrines of offer, acceptance, and 
consideration. See e.g. Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, 4th ed by Richard 
A Lord, vol 1 (Rochester, NY: Lawyers Cooperative, 1990) s 3.5; Atiyah, Law of Contract, 
supra note 1, ch 7; Angela Swan, Canadian Contract Law, 2d ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 
2009) ch 2.4; BA Hepple, “Intention to Create Legal Relations” (1970) 28:1 Cambridge LJ 
122; Andrew Robertson, “The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract” (2005) 29:1 Melbourne 
UL Rev 179 [Robertson, “The Limits of Voluntariness”]. Section 21 of the Restatement of 
Law, Second: Contracts provides that no intention to create legal relations is required to form 
a contract. See Restatement of the Law, Second: Contracts 2d (St. Paul, MN: American Law 
Institute, 1981) [Restatement of Law (Second)].
7. The orthodox explanation for this is that since the law presumes that parties who were at 
arm’s length when they negotiated their bargain had the requisite legal intention, triers of fact 
are rarely called upon to investigate whether the parties actually had such an intention. But 
this orthodox answer will not satisfy the skeptic who doubts that it is a genuine requirement 
of a contract that the parties intend to create legal relations. From the skeptic’s point of 
view, it is more likely that courts rarely assess whether the parties to an agreement intended 
to be legally bound because the question is of no legal relevance, rather than that it is of 
fundamental legal importance but there is seldom any doubt about the matter.
8. Balfour, supra note 5. See also Jones v Padavatton, [1969] 2 All ER 616, [1969] 1 WLR 328 
(Eng), Danckwerts and Fenton Atkinson LJJ.
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the most celebrated example of such a case, has Canadian progeny.9 But the 
Balfour line of cases does not silence the skeptics. Certainly it is true that where 
friends, intimates, or parties otherwise not at arm’s length make agreements, the 
courts often refuse to enforce them, ostensibly on the basis that the parties did 
not intend their agreement to have legal consequences. But cases like Balfour 
provide only ambiguous evidence of the reality of a contractual requirement of 
an intention to be legally bound. There are reasons for thinking that the law of 
contract ought not to concern itself with strictly domestic and social agreements 
that are unrelated to the intentions of the parties.10 So when courts refuse to 
enforce such agreements by invoking facts about intentions that they seldom 
even investigate in relation to other kinds of agreements, the skeptics respond, 
plausibly, that these cases actually have little to do with the intentions of the 
parties. The “intention to create legal relations” requirement invoked in the 
Balfour line of cases is, the skeptics insist, merely a fiction used by judges to limit 
the extent to which the law enforces non-arm’s length agreements or agreements 
that are outside of the market. It is a tool for “keeping contract in its place.”11
In this article, I invoke a different line of cases against the skeptics 
in support of the thesis that parties to a contract must intend to be legally 
obligated by their agreement. The cases I invoke are those in which the parties 
are explicit that they do not intend their agreement to be legally binding. When 
parties purport to remove their agreement from the ambit of the law in this 
way, I say that they have issued a “disclaimer.” If a disclaimer clearly expresses 
the intentions of both parties, it will always be effective in precluding either 
party from enforcing the agreement as a contract. Contractual obligations are, 
in other words, disclaimer-sensitive: They do not obtain if the parties have 
included a disclaimer in their agreement. The decision in Rose & Frank Company 
v JR Crompton and Brothers Limited, in which the House of Lords refused to 
9. See e.g. Steinberg v Steinberg (1963),  45 DLR (2d) 162, 45 WWR 562 (Sask QB); Buchmaier 
v Buchmaier (1971), 6 RFL 382 (available on Quicklaw) (BCCA); Rogalsky Estate v Rogalsky 
(1984), 32 Man R (2d) 223, 30 ACWS (2d) 165 (Man QB); Decorby v Decorby (1989), 57 
Man R (2d) 241, 14 ACWS (3d) 230 (Man CA).
10. See e.g. Jill Poole, Textbook on Contract Law, 11th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) s 5.2; Mindy Chen-Wishart, “Consideration and Serious Intention” [2009] 2 Sing JLS 
434 at 452-53; Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 297-98.
11. Stephen Hedley, “Keeping Contract in its Place—Balfour v Balfour and the Enforceability 
of Informal Agreements” (1985) 5:3 Oxford J Legal Stud 391 at 391 [Hedley, “Keeping 
Contract in its Place”].
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enforce an agreement that included an unambiguous “honour” clause, is the 
best-known authority for this proposition.12
Disclaimer-sensitivity is a striking feature of contractual obligations 
that stands in need of explanation. Why should parties who make a bargain 
while disavowing an intention to acquire a legal obligation not acquire one, if 
making a bargain otherwise attracts such an obligation? What accounts for the 
normative difference that disclaimers make? I argue in what follows that the 
most plausible explanation is that contractual obligations are voluntary. I argue, 
in other words, that if contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive, then they 
must also be voluntary.
II. VOLUNTARINESS AND THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO 
INTENTIONS
Before examining the relationship between disclaimer-sensitivity and 
voluntariness, I address a preliminary matter. Assume for the moment that there 
is a genuine contractual requirement that the parties must intend to create legal 
obligations. The intentions with which such a requirement is concerned will not 
always be those that the parties actually possessed. Here, as elsewhere in contract 
law, one will sometimes be deemed to have intended what others reasonably 
inferred from one’s words and deeds that one intended.13 The law will substitute 
a person’s objective intentions for his actual intentions where this is required to 
ensure that contracts fulfill their function of permitting parties to order their 
affairs in reliance on them.
12. [1924] UKHL 2, [1925] AC 445 [Rose & Frank]. See also Ferrera v Littlewoods Pools Ltd 
(1998), [1998] EWCA Civ 618 (Eng); Halloway v Cuozzo (1999), EWCA Civ 746 (Eng). 
Disclaimers are often incorporated into so-called “comfort letters.” When disclaimers are 
clear and unambiguous, they render these letters unenforceable. See Toronto-Dominion Bank 
v Leigh Instruments Ltd (Trustee of ) (1999), 45 OR (3d) 417, 124 OAC 87 (Ont CA).
13. Thus courts determine the meaning of a word or phrase in a contract not by reference to 
what the drafter intended it to mean, but by reference to what a reasonable person in the 
other party’s position would take the drafter to have intended. See e.g. Water Street Pictures 
Ltd v Forefront Releasing Inc, 2006 BCCA 459 at paras 30-43, 57 BCLR (4th) 212.
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Despite some dramatic remarks by some judges and scholars to the contrary,14 
I suspect that this substitution does not seriously undermine the thesis that 
contractual obligations are voluntary. In the first place, bargaining parties are 
generally adept at interpreting each other’s intentions. Objective intent is usually 
excellent evidence of actual intent, and the substitution by a court of objective 
intention for a divergent actual intention is therefore rare.
More fundamentally, the rule that an objective intention to be legally bound 
will suffice to generate contractual liability, far from repudiating the idea that 
contractual obligations are voluntary, is in fact evidence that the law takes this 
idea seriously. The rule protects promisees by permitting them to rely on their 
own reasonable assessment of whether they have a contract with the promisor—
that is, of whether the requirements of contract formation have been satisfied. 
The reason that a contract may be created by a party who displays an objective 
intention to be legally obligated is precisely that contracts can be formed only 
by parties who subjectively intend to be legally obligated. The law construes a 
merely apparent intention as a genuine intention just insofar as that is necessary 
to protect a promisee in his or her reasonable inference that the promisor had the 
requisite genuine intention. The rule concerning the sufficiency of an objective 
intention to be legally obligated is therefore not a fundamental rule of contract 
formation. Rather, it is a rule about how the basic requirement of actual legal 
intention can be satisfied in certain exceptional cases.
I do not pretend to have reconciled objectivity and voluntariness with this 
brief argument; the problem of subjectivity and objectivity in contract formation 
is a vexing one that is beyond my scope here.15 It is enough for my purposes to 
14. For example, in Hotchkiss v National City Bank of New York, the court held: “A contract 
has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. 
A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, 
usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.” See Hotchkiss v 
National City Bank of New York, 200 F 287 at 293 (Dist Ct NY 1911). See also Atiyah states: 
“Every law student is taught from his earliest days that contractual intent is not really what it 
seems; actual subjective intent is normally irrelevant. It is the appearance, the manifestation 
of intent that matters.” PS Atiyah, Essays on Contract (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986) at 21. See also Robertson, “The Limits of Voluntariness,” supra note 6 at 187ff.
15. For a sampling of the scholarly debate, see JR Spencer, “Signature, Consent, and the Rule 
in L’Estrange v Graucob” (1973) 32:1 Cambridge LJ 104; William Howarth, “The Meaning 
of Objectivity in Contract” (1984) 100:2 Law Q Rev 265; JP Vorster, “A Comment on the 
Meaning of Objectivity in Contract” (1987) 103:2 Law Q Rev 274; David Goddard, “The 
Myth of Subjectivity” (1987) 7:3 LS 263; DW McLauchlan, “Objectivity in Contract” 
(2005) 24:2 UQLJ 479; Brian Coote, “Reflections on Intention in the Law of Contract” 
[2006] 2 NZL Rev 183.
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show that objectivity is not the obvious and conclusive answer to voluntariness 
that it is often taken to be. In what follows, I use the word “intention” in an 
undifferentiated way to refer to whichever kind of intention, actual or objective, 
the law is concerned with under the circumstances. An obligation can thus be 
voluntary in the robust sense that I have defined, even though it can obtain in 
the absence of an actual intention to acquire it. For the reasons I have outlined, 
I think the nexus between objective and actual intention in the law of contract 
justifies using the term “voluntary” to refer to contractual obligations if they 
depend on either phenomenon. But nothing in my article turns on the use of this 
term, and if the reader prefers, he or she may substitute ‘voluntary’ (with scare 
quotes) for “voluntary” in what follows.
III. EXPLAINING DISCLAIMER-SENSITIVITY
Rose & Frank and cases like it establish that parties who qualify their agreements 
with a disclaimer thereby avoid contractual liability.16 In other words, contractual 
obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. I argue that this feature of contractual 
obligations can be explained in a plausible way only if contractual obligations are 
voluntary. I argue, in other words, that if contractual obligations are disclaimer-
sensitive, then they must also be voluntary.
The truth of this claim is not obvious, but it is sometimes assumed to be. 
Courts and commentators often invoke cases like Rose & Frank to support 
the view that there is a requirement of legal intention in contract formation, 
i.e., that contractual obligations are voluntary.17 Some of these authors seem 
to assume that voluntariness can be inferred from disclaimer-sensitivity in the 
following simple way: A disclaimer is evidence that the parties had no intention 
to generate legal obligations when making their agreement; a disclaimer prevents 
an agreement from generating a contractual obligation; therefore, agreements 
16. See supra note 12.
17. Many of those text-writers from Commonwealth jurisdictions that take the view that 
contracts require an intention to create legal relations discuss Rose & Frank in connection 
with that requirement, and Professor McCamus is no exception. See John D McCamus, The 
Law of Contracts, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) ch 4. See also Edwin Peel, Treitel: The 
Law of Contract, 12th ed (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at 177; Bruce MacDougall, 
Introduction to Contracts (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2007) at 48; J Beatson, Anson’s Law 
of Contract, 28th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 71, n 277; Mindy 
Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 114.
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generate contractual obligations only if they are made with an intention to create 
legal obligations.18
This simple inference from disclaimer-sensitivity to voluntariness is too 
quick. It presupposes that disclaimers preclude contractual obligations because 
they are evidence that the parties did not intend to create legal obligations. If 
disclaimers were evidence of this fact, and of no other fact, then an inference 
from disclaimer-sensitivity to voluntariness would follow. But disclaimers reveal 
not only that the parties lacked the intent to create a legal obligation, they also 
reveal that the parties intended not to create a legal obligation. These two facts 
are not the same. That the parties to an agreement intend not to create legal 
obligations entails that they do not intend to create legal obligations, but the 
entailment does not go in the other direction. Imagine two parties making an 
agreement who are unaware that there is any law relating to the making and 
keeping of agreements. Arthur Linton Corbin wrote of an agreement to trade a 
horse for a cow by “two ignorant persons who never heard of a legal relation and 
who do not know that society offers any kind of a remedy for the enforcement of 
such an agreement.”19 These farmers have no intention to create legal obligations, 
but they do not intend their agreement not to create such obligations.
In light of this, we can see why voluntariness cannot be inferred from 
disclaimer-sensitivity in a straightforward way. Disclaimers reveal two distinct 
facts about the intentions of the parties, and it is not obvious to which of them 
the law responds when it refuses to enforce disclaimer-qualified agreements. Are 
such agreements unenforceable because of the intention (to be legally bound) 
that disclaimers reveal to be absent, or because of the intention (not to be legally 
bound) that they reveal to be present?
I argue that the latter possibility is not plausible. If I am right about this, 
then it must follow that it is the absence of an intention to be legally bound to 
which the law responds when it refuses to enforce an agreement that is qualified 
by a disclaimer—that is, contractual obligations must be voluntary. In other 
words, if I am right then it follows from the disclaimer-sensitivity of contractual 
obligations that they are voluntary.
The skeptic will agree with me that a simple inference from disclaimer-
sensitivity to voluntariness is impermissible but will resist my claim that 
18. This inference is rarely made explicit but it is the most plausible way to make sense of those 
who invoke Rose & Frank as authority for (or even as pertaining to) the voluntariness of 
contractual obligations.
19. Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of 
Contract Law, vol 1, revised ed (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co, 1963) s 34 at 135.
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disclaimer-sensitivity can be plausibly explained only if contractual liability is 
voluntary. At least one skeptic has advanced an argument along these lines. In a 
well-known article, Stephen Hedley argued that there is no “necessary connection” 
between disclaimer cases like Rose & Frank and a requirement that contracting 
parties intend to create legal obligations.20 While these cases “mesh perfectly” 
with such a requirement, they do not provide any independent evidence of such 
a requirement since “the fact that a rule of law may be excluded by the intentions 
of the parties does not show that the rule itself is based on those intentions.”21 
Hedley’s point appears to be that these cases also mesh perfectly with a rule 
permitting parties to exclude contractual liability intentionally by means of a 
disclaimer. On this view, Rose & Frank and its ilk are cases about the legal efficacy 
of disclaimers, not about the intention to create legal obligations.
Hedley does not develop his objection any further than this, apparently 
regarding it as more or less obvious. In what follows I argue that this point is 
mistaken. There is no plausible way to justify cases like Rose & Frank, which 
establish that contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive, unless such 
obligations are also voluntary.
IV. VOLUNTARINESS OR AVOIDABILITY?
Let C represent the set of necessary and sufficient conditions (c1, c2, c3, ... cn) under 
which the parties to an agreement acquire an enforceable contractual obligation 
(O) to adhere to the agreement. C includes, for example, conditions requiring 
that the parties provide consideration, that the agreement be sufficiently complete 
and certain, and so on. Now imagine two parties, A and B, who negotiate an 
agreement with each other in two possible worlds. In the first world, W1, all of 
the conditions in C are satisfied and the parties acquire O. The second world, W2, 
is the nearest possible world to W1 in which the parties qualify their agreement by 
a disclaimer. Since O is disclaimer-sensitive, the parties acquire O in W1 but not 
in W2. One or more of the antecedents of O (c1, c2, c3, … cn) is not satisfied in 
W2. What is it about O that explains why our parties acquire it in the first world 
but not in the second? By virtue of what feature of contractual obligations is this 
difference to be explained?
From the discussion in Part III, above, of what disclaimers reveal about 
parties’ intentions, two possible explanations present themselves. The first is that 
contractual obligations are voluntary. On this view, C includes a voluntariness 
20. Hedley, “Keeping Contract in its Place,” supra note 11 at 399.
21. Ibid at 400, 401 [emphasis removed].
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condition, cv, by virtue of which O obtains only if the parties intended to create 
legal obligations when they made their agreement. I refer to this view as the 
“Voluntariness Thesis”:
Voluntariness Thesis: The law enforces an agreement as a contract only if the parties 
intended their agreement to create legal obligations.
The second possible explanation for disclaimer-sensitivity is that contractual 
obligations do not depend on an intention to create legal obligations but rather 
that such obligations are precluded if the parties intend that their agreement 
is not to create legal obligations. On this view cv is not included in C, but C 
includes an “avoidability” condition, ca, by virtue of which O is not acquired if 
the parties intend to avoid becoming legally obligated by their agreement. I call 
this the “Avoidability Thesis”:
Avoidability Thesis: The fact that the parties to an agreement did not intend to 
become legally obligated by their agreement is irrelevant to whether it ought to be 
enforced, but the fact that they intended to avoid becoming legally obligated by 
their agreement is a sufficient reason not to enforce it.
This thesis is presupposed by section 21 of the American Restatement of 
Law (Second), which provides that “[n]either real nor apparent intention that 
a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a 
manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may 
prevent the formation of a contract.”22
Contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. It follows from this that 
either the Voluntariness Thesis is true or the Avoidability Thesis is true. (They 
cannot both be true.) I proceed now to argue that the Avoidability Thesis is false.
V. A REDUCTIO OF THE AVOIDABILITY THESIS
According to the Avoidability Thesis, contractual obligations are avoidable but 
not voluntary. I argue that this thesis is not plausible. My argument takes the 
form of a reductio. The Avoidability Thesis implies, first, that A and B acquire O 
in W1 even if they did not intend to acquire it, and, second, that the fact that A 
and B intended to avoid acquiring O in W2 is a sufficient reason for not imposing 
O on them in W2. The Avoidability Thesis therefore implies that the following 
proposition (P) is true:
22. Restatement of Law (Second), supra note 6, s 21.
PRATT, DISCLAIMERS OF CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 779
Proposition (P): The fact that A and B intended to avoid acquiring O when making 
their agreement in W2 is a sufficient reason to preclude them from acquiring O, 
notwithstanding that their having made the same agreement with no such intention 
in W1 was sufficient to justify imposing O on them.
I claim that this proposition is implausible. The fact that A and B intended 
to avoid acquiring O when making their agreement in W2 cannot be a sufficient 
reason to preclude them from acquiring O, if their having made the same 
agreement was a sufficient reason for imposing O on them in W1.
Unless an obligation is voluntary, the fact that a party intends to avoid 
acquiring it when he or she behaves in a certain manner is irrelevant to whether 
he or she will acquire that obligation when he or she behaves in that manner. The 
party’s intention to avoid acquiring the obligation is normatively inert, in the 
sense specified by the following principle:
Inertness Principle: My plea that in doing some act ? (e.g., making an agreement 
with you) I intended to avoid acquiring an obligation to you to do ? (e.g., to fulfill 
the terms of the agreement) cannot excuse my not doing ? if my doing ? with no 
such intention is sufficient to obligate me to you to do ?.
I take the truth of this principle to be more or less obvious. If I do ? with 
no intention of acquiring (or avoiding) an obligation to you to do ?, and I 
thereby acquire an obligation to you to do ?, then that obligation is presumably 
grounded in some interest you have in my doing ? after having done ?. And the 
normative force of this interest cannot be reduced by my intention or desire that 
it be reduced. If by taking another’s property one becomes obligated to return 
it, then if I take your bicycle I thereby acquire an obligation to return it even if I 
intended to avoid such an obligation when I took it.
If the Inertness Principle is true, then proposition P must be false, and since 
P is entailed by the Avoidability Thesis, the latter thesis is also false. Since the 
Avoidability Thesis is false, the Voluntariness Thesis must be true.
VI. THE INTERNALIZATION STRATEGY
One way to defend the Avoidability Thesis against my reductio is to argue that 
when the law gives effect to a disclaimer, it is simply giving effect to the parties’ 
agreement. On this view, the law enforces agreements as contracts even if the 
parties do not intend to be legally bound by them and disclaimers are terms 
in agreements, enforced like any other term. In other words, disclaimers are 
internal to agreements and disclaimer-sensitivity follows from the law’s respect for 
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agreements.23 This view finds its most authoritative expression in the comments 
to section 21 of the Restatement, which explain that, “[p]arties to what would 
otherwise be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree that their legal relations are 
not to be affected. … [S]uch a term is respected by the law like any other term.”24
The first difficulty with the internalization strategy is that it seems to be 
incoherent. It holds that the law gives effect to disclaimers because they are terms 
in agreements, and agreements are enforceable. But to give effect to a disclaimer 
is to render unenforceable the agreement of which it is a part. The internalization 
strategy therefore implies, incoherently, that an agreement with a disclaimer in it 
is unenforceable only to the extent that it is enforceable.25
Even if this logical problem can be remedied, the internalization strategy 
seems to beg the question that it seeks to answer—namely, why the law gives effect 
to disclaimers. The strategy purports to explain the legal force of disclaimers by 
internalizing them to agreements and invoking the enforceability of agreements 
as an explanation. On this view agreements are enforced, and disclaimers have 
legal effect because they are terms in agreements. This suggests a picture of an 
agreement as a kind of enforcing container that confers legal effect on any terms 
that are poured into it. But this is not quite right. The law does not enforce 
terms (merely) because they are contained within agreements; it enforces terms 
because they comprise agreements. An agreement consists in its terms, and the 
law enforces agreements just insofar as it enforces the terms that comprise them. 
23. I argued that the Avoidability Thesis entails proposition P, which falls foul of the Inertness 
Principle. The internalization strategy avoids this reductio by denying that the Avoidability 
Thesis entails proposition P. According to that proposition, A and B did the same thing (?) in 
W1 and W2—they made the same agreement—albeit with different intentions. According to 
the internalization strategy, however, A and B did not do the same thing in W1 and W2, for 
if disclaimers form part of the agreements that they qualify, then A and B did not make the 
same agreement in W2 that they made in W1. In W2 the parties made their agreement with 
the mutual intention that it not be legally binding and that mutual intention became part of 
their agreement in W2.
24. Restatement of Law (Second), supra note 6, s 21. See also Smith, Contract Theory, supra note 1 
at 212-13; MP Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 14th ed (London, 
UK: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2001) at 127; Atiyah, Law of Contract, supra note 1 at 153.
25. It may be urged that this charge of incoherence is mistaken because a disclaimer does 
not render unenforceable the entire agreement of which it is a part. Rather, it renders 
unenforceable all the terms in the agreement other than the disclaimer itself. But this move 
will not work. The internalization strategy insists that a disclaimer is to be treated like any 
other term in an enforceable agreement. But if a disclaimer is treated as enforceable only 
to the extent that the other terms are enforceable, then the internalization strategy implies, 
absurdly, that a disclaimer renders all the other terms unenforceable just to the extent that all 
those terms are enforceable.
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The internalization strategy is plausible, therefore, only if disclaimers are terms of 
a kind that the law enforces. But disclaimers seem very different from the kinds 
of terms that render agreements enforceable.
Agreements that are enforceable as contracts consist of terms that supply the 
agreements with content by specifying the states of affairs that fulfill or violate 
them. These terms are of three kinds. The first are “performance-terms” that 
stipulate what the agreement requires of the parties by way of performance. The 
second are “warranty-terms” that provide that if certain facts not related to the 
actions of the parties do not obtain, then the agreement is violated (e.g., a term 
warranting the provenance of the goods sold). Conditions are a third kind of 
term. A condition specifies the circumstances under which other terms become 
or cease to be part of the agreement.
Disclaimers are unlike any of these three kinds of ordinary terms. Disclaimers 
express the parties’ intentions with respect to the legal force of their agreement. 
They do not supply the agreement with content by specifying the circumstances 
under which it is violated. Rather, disclaimers purport to deprive the agreement 
of its status as a contract; they aim to determine its status in law rather than 
its scope as an agreement. “This is a (morally) binding agreement,” declares a 
disclaimer, “but it is not a contract.”
This difference between ordinary terms and disclaimers is a problem for the 
internalization strategy. An agreement comprising ordinary terms is enforceable, 
and therefore agreements are enforceable by virtue of having contents that define 
the circumstances under which they are violated. The contractual status of an 
agreement is, in other words, a function of its being an agreement capable of 
being fulfilled or violated as an agreement. Since disclaimers do not define 
the content of an agreement in this way, their status as terms in an agreement 
cannot explain their legal force because they are not the kind of terms that make 
agreements enforceable. By the internalization strategy’s own lights, the law 
respects agreements not as juristic acts or intentional exercises of legal power 
but as pre-legal arrangements by which the parties mutually commit themselves 
to ensure that certain states of affairs obtain. There is no reason to think that 
because the law lends its force to such arrangements, it therefore also gives effect 
to declarations in such arrangements that they are not to have contractual status.
To summarize, the claim that disclaimers are “respected by the law just like 
any other term”26 is either mistaken or question-begging. If the claim is that 
disclaimers are just like any other term, it is mistaken. Conceived as terms, 
disclaimers are status-determining rather than content-providing. If the claim 
26. Restatement of Law (Second), supra note 6, s 21.
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is rather that the law treats disclaimers just like any other term by affording 
them the same legal effect, then it generates the very question that it purports to 
answer—namely, why does the law give effect to disclaimers?
VII. CONCLUSION
Rose & Frank and its progeny establish that contractual obligations are disclaimer-
sensitive. This striking feature of contractual obligations is often discussed by 
text-writers and judges in connection with a requirement that contracting parties 
must intend to create legal obligations. The precise nature of the relationship 
between this requirement and disclaimer-sensitivity is, however, rarely examined 
or made explicit. If the requirement of legal intention were manifestly part of the 
law of contract—if it were axiomatic that contractual obligations are voluntary—
then disclaimer-sensitivity could be explained as a corollary of that feature. But 
voluntariness is a disputed characteristic of contractual obligations. Skeptics of 
the Voluntariness Thesis abound. Few, however, are those who would deny that 
contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. It would be fruitful, therefore, to 
be able to derive the disputed requirement that contracting parties must intend 
to create legal obligations from the settled premise that contractual obligations 
are disclaimer-sensitive. That is what I have attempted to do here.
It is sometimes assumed that the voluntariness of contractual obligations 
follows straightforwardly from the fact that they are disclaimer-sensitive. I have 
argued that no such straightforward inference is possible. The relationship 
between these two features is more complex than previous writers appear to have 
appreciated. I have argued that if contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive, 
then either the Voluntariness Thesis is true or the Avoidability Thesis is true; that 
the Avoidability Thesis cannot be sustained; and that, therefore, the Voluntariness 
Thesis is true.
I first encountered the idea of disclaimer-sensitivity—the notion that 
contractual obligations can be avoided by disavowing an intention to create 
them—as a first-year student in Professor McCamus’s classroom. I like to think 
that my former teacher will find my arguments in this article persuasive. But 
more than that, I hope that he will take some pride in having helped to inspire in 
one of his students a passion for the law of contract sufficient to cause him still to 
be writing and thinking about its foundations all these years later.
